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Towards a model of the intervention process
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This paper explores the challenging circumstances when one part of government decides that the 
performance of a subsidiary part is unacceptable and arranges some kind of remedial intervention. 
Following the detailed analysis of a series of four central local government interventions we develop 
a model of the intervention process that combines the type of problem addressed (service-specific 
and/or corporate) and approach to intervention available (challenging and/or supporting). In 
addition to extending current conceptual understanding of this under-researched phenomenon, 
the work generates a number of specific practical insights for future intervention policy.
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Introduction
Although notions of performance failure and improvement are inherently ‘complex 
and contested’ in the domain of public value (de Bruijn, 2006; Harvey et al, 2010), 
inadequate local government performance frequently results in central government 
enacting some form of ‘improving’ intervention. Contingent discussion regarding 
the extent to which central government can legitimately appropriate and enact 
such powers,1 or whether such interventions are an inevitable consequence of the 
proliferation of public performance measurement systems enforced through audit 
and inspection (Moynihan and Pandey, 2010), are beyond the scope of this work, 
but to note that such interventions occur, and occur with reasonable frequency, is 
undeniable.2  Various patterns of different service delivery problems and/or systemic 
governance concerns can initiate an intervention (or indeed interventions), and the 
subsequent processes can also vary significantly in scope, duration and conclusion. 
Interventions range from informal guidance and requests for amended plans, for 
example, through to the mandatory use of external consultants (Glass, 1998), 
introduction of new programmes (Rose and Haynes, 1999) or imposition of external 
monitors to oversee changes (Turner et al, 2004), or even assuming full control of a 
local service or council (Coe, 2008; Beeri, 2013). It is this variety that motivates and 
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bounds the paper. Although the research clearly builds upon and seeks to contribute to 
the broader literature on public service improvement (for example, Lewis and Hartley, 
2001; Boyne 2004a; 2004b) and ‘turnaround’ in particular (Turner et al, 2004; Jas and 
Skelcher, 2005; Boyne, 2006), the specific details of different intervention processes 
remain under-explored. The paper seeks to make both a practical and conceptual 
contribution by addressing the following research question: What are the characteristics 
of an intervention process?
We address this question by investigating multiple interventions within a single 
governance context, specifically a series of interventions by the devolved Welsh 
Government in Cardiff into a range of different local government activities. The 
fieldwork explored the starting points, key activities and eventual outcomes of four 
cases. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we outline the initial definitional 
model and present a number of more specific research questions; detail the research 
process and key findings; discuss these findings in the light of the research questions; 
and highlight key conclusions for theory and practice.
Exploring the intervention process
In most multi-tiered systems of public administration (where national, federal, state, 
regional, local governance coexist), circumstances can arise where a range of ‘higher 
level’ political and professional actors, including independent inspectors and auditors 
(compare with Wheat, 1991), judge that the level of service being delivered at a 
subsidiary level is unacceptable. Occasionally, these judgements result in the decision 
to intervene and directly effect changes in the ‘failing’ organisation. In order to 
better structure an investigation of these interventions, a definitional framework is 
developed below; exploring initiating triggers, intervention processes and practices, 
and ultimate outcomes. In discussing these elements a series of more specific research 
questions are presented.
What triggers an intervention?
Although the decision to intervene is often based on a series of incidents and perceived 
unacceptable performance, specific circumstances will preempt the ‘triggering’ of 
any intervention. There are corporate or organisational issues that can result in an 
intervention but, as highlighted in the examples above, the majority of triggers relate 
to service delivery.
A number of factors contribute towards such an emphasis on service delivery: 
the increased focus on measurement in public administration (compare with new 
public management: Kessler and Purcell, 1996; Hood and Peters, 2004), and the 
provision of key indicators which provide a clear-cut means of assessing persistent 
under-performance and failure. Moreover, a focus on negative outcomes for specific 
service recipients (such as children, victims of crime) has provided a strong political 
and professional narrative that could help to legitimise any intervention, and in 
many countries central government may invoke specific powers to deal with child 
protection issues. 
Conversely, corporate governance triggers are often based on more subjective 
judgements (for instance, an assessment of a blame culture); if there is no evidence 
of service failure, the legitimacy of any formal intervention tends to be challenged. 
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Although service and corporate failure modes are generally strongly linked, it is 
unlikely that service problems would be consistently ignored in a strong corporate 
performance management culture. Therefore, the first research question seeks to 
establish:
RQ1. What are the differences between interventions triggered by service specific and corporate 
performance problems?
What happens during the intervention process?
All interventions are essentially ‘top-down’; part of a coercive process underpinned by 
resource (reward) and legal-political (legitimate) power3 (French and Raven, 1960). 
This directive nature was self-evident in the kind of structural interventions typified 
by the formal takeover. For example, in 2002 the state of Pennsylvania intervened in 
the running of Philadelphia’s public schools following years of consistently poor test 
results, creating a new School Reform Commission (replacing the local school board). 
Forty-five elementary schools were privatised and significant reforms were mandated 
for the remaining public schools, under the direction of a new CEO (Gill et al, 2007). 
 Due to the political, legal, administrative and structural complexities of such 
formal interventions accompanied by the dysfunctional effects (that is, staff departures, 
depressed morale, psychological resistance: Bullock, 1986), most interventions are 
less dramatic (Turner et al, 2004). Requirements to monitor an organisation more 
closely or to transfer best practices can be fraught with difficulties. The most effective 
solution is typically some form of enhanced horizontal interaction, possibly facilitated 
by peer organisations. It is relatively common to convene an external expert panel, 
or to employ consultants to provide assessment, training and interim staffing solution. 
Whatever the mix of specific practices, two distinct ‘types’ of activity appear to be 
associated with an intervention process. First, it has been explicitly recognised that 
any ‘recovering’ organisation is undertaking a psychological journey (Boyne, 2004a) 
that requires it to overcome any residual ‘denial’. This will mean that the intervention 
process is likely to comprise substantial periods of challenging the organisation (such 
as monitoring/auditing, mandating of certain actions: Coe, 2008). At the same time, 
in addition to these directive type activities, there is also evidence of a range of more 
supportive activities associated with an intervention. For instance, given that it is 
widely accepted that an organisation’s leadership acts as a crucial change agent in 
any sustainable improvement programme (Jones, 1999; Jones 2004; Sanger, 2008), 
it has been concluded that the intervention needs to, at some point, afford local 
leadership the necessary ‘space’ to re-establish their own authority. This leads to the 
second research question:
RQ2 What is the mixture of challenging and supportive activity in an intervention process?
Beyond a general recognition that organisations with a history of under-performance 
and/or a set of challenging contextual factors (such as small budgets or geographical 
recruitment problems) are likely to require a substantial time to achieve meaningful 
levels of improvement, there is limited insight regarding the specific dynamics of an 
intervention. Although any answers to questions such as the ‘optimum’ timeframe 
for an intervention are likely to be imprecise (at best) with our multi-case method, 
building on discussion of triggers and types of activity in an intervention, the third 
research question asks:
RQ3. Do interventions follow a generic trajectory? that is, initiation, activity and completion)?
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What happens after an intervention?
It was important to adopt a critical approach to discussions of intervention success, 
yet for public sector change initiatives, it is difficult to determine what ‘success’ 
actually means. Establishing counterfactuals, what would have happened without 
the intervention, is impossible, and it is sensible to be cautious when evaluating 
improvement over relatively short periods. Rafferty and Griffin (2000) found that 
the larger the scale and scope of the intervention (the more organisational levels 
affected), the greater the chance of a positive outcome. The same authors also found 
that the higher the initial morale of participants (potentially unlikely in the context of 
a large-scale intervention) then the greater likelihood any change would be successful. 
Although there have been high profile examples, such as the Pennsylvanian 
intervention (Gallard, 2010), that generated inconsistent results and resulted in 
significant residual acrimony between the various stakeholders, it seems probable 
that a sensibly designed and executed intervention could have a significantly positive 
impact (Boyne and Dahya, 2002). Measuring performance in the public sector is 
hampered by the complexity of the services being delivered and a legacy of not 
engaging in performance measures that are meaningful (Rose and Haynes, 1999; 
Jones 2004). This may in part explain the lack of outcome variables in research on 
public sector change – it is difficult to determine what ‘success’ actually means in 
public sector change initiatives. The soft improvements being realised are hard to 
quantify. Even after the introduction of a comprehensive assessment framework in 
the UK in 2002, public service performance is still complex, covering a range of 
issues that must be addressed, making management analysis difficult, although not 
impossible (Boyne, 2004a). 
Overall, given that interventions are often triggered by very low levels of 
performance, bring with them increased resources, comprise a wide range of different 
practices and types of activity and, through continuous monitoring and measurement, 
are unlikely to come to an end before there has been demonstrable improvement, 
any assumption of positive impact needs more awareness of contingency
Connecting this to the first three research questions leads to the final one:
RQ4 What influence do different triggers, types of activity and timings have on the success 
of an intervention process?
The research method
The research was carried out in the United Kingdom. Fieldwork explored the 
starting points, key activities and eventual outcomes of a series of local government 
interventions by the Government of Wales. The Government of Wales holds devolved 
authority from the National Government in London. As such, there are parallels 
between this context and state government in the United States and regional 
government in Canada/Australia, as well as other many countries. A set of four 
cases is presented from a set of seven cases, which were selected through discussions 
between the research team and senior members of the Welsh Assembly Government 
(WAG), who identified councils that were currently exhibiting, or had a history of, 
performance concerns and had been the subject of some form of support/intervention. 
Case studies were chosen for investigating the support/intervention phenomenon 
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because of the need for sensitivity in assessing complex and intangible issues (that is, 
relationships, power, trust, and so on), and to adopt a rich and contextualised view.
The research employed a multiple case study method (Stake, 1995; Dubois and 
Gadde, 2002). Although the research explored a diverse ecology of support and 
intervention processes (varied triggers, unique contexts, different timelines, and so 
on), two dimensions were employed that related to the first two research questions 
outlined earlier, enabling the research team to categorise each of the cases into one 
of four types of support/intervention (Figure 1):
1. The initiating performance concerns and principal focus of improvement activity: 
service-specific or corporate governance.
2. The nature of the intervention activity: external to the council (for example, via 
regulators, WAG, peer agencies) or internal through the political and managerial 
leadership arrangements (challenge or support).
The specific location on the sampling frame reflects the details of each case. The case 
study summaries are included in Table 1, but throughout the analysis of the findings 
these types have been used as an aggregate shorthand for the individual cases. For the 
purpose of this study, four cases were selected from the set of seven studies because, ex 
ante, their descriptions fitted each of the four archetypes defined by the intersection of 
these two analytical dimensions (see Figure 1). In addition, to increase comparability, 
cases A and B had experienced problems with the same type of service (children’s 
social services).
Primary and secondary data was collected 
on seven possible cases. A total of 75 
interviews with 63 different people were 
conducted, lasting between 45 minutes and 
two hours. The questions covered context 
and initiation; process (including exit 
decisions); overall timescales; assessments of 
success or failure, and roles played by actors 
in the broader network (including peers, 
members of the regulatory ‘family’). In 
addition, minutes of meetings, inspectorate 
reports, audits and results from self-inspection 
tools were reviewed. A longitudinal approach 
in its pure form (following events for 
2–3 years) was impractical, but data was 
collected over a nine-month period and retrospective insights collected using critical 
incident techniques. The draft cases were returned to the interviewees for review 
and commentary. In addition, a final workshop was held where a cross-section of 
key stakeholders were given the opportunity to reflect and comment upon a first 
draft of the case findings/conclusions. Table 1 summarises initiating triggers and 
intervention activities, together with key (inner and outer) contextual information 
for each of the cases.
Figure 1: Sampling the case studies
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Discussion
RQ1. Differences between service and corporate performance triggers
Due to the greater clarity around the legal powers used to enable the service-
specific interventions, they appeared – as anticipated – to be more ‘acceptable’ to the 
receiving organisations (hard data was available on service-specific performance that 
was difficult to challenge). With both of the corporate governance triggers there was 
noticeably more resistance: “at the start we did feel it was unfair as we believed our 
major services were efficient… we struggled to believe corporate governance was 
so bad… by the end we knew how far behind we were” (Service Director, D). Both 
organisations went to significant lengths to try to avoid formal interventions. In case 
C for example, the new management team generated a range of specific programmes 
and initiatives to improve governance and service performance, explicitly “in order to 
avoid what we perceived to be the very real disadvantages of a… formal intervention 
protocol” (Senior Politician). In part this acceptability bias reflected the anticipated 
advantages of clear, service-specific performance data and, with Children’s Services 
in particular, the emotive nature of the subject (and its potential media sensitivities). 
For example, several interviewees stressed “don’t forget it’s for the children”, and this 
became a form of central mission statement. It was also interesting to observe that 
in both cases A and C the services had become disconnected from (or in case A, had 
never been connected to) the rest of the organisation. Social Services in case A had 
become an area that was “insulated from its partner functions and organisations and 
was culturally uncomfortable with performance measurement and management” 
(Chief Executive). This disconnection allowed actors to talk (at least initially) about 
the performance issues being bounded inside one part of the organisation, with the 
prima facie explanation for both failures being the lack of suitably qualified staff.
Despite this attempt at compartmentalisation, it was clear that service-specific 
failure modes also reflected significant problems with organisational governance (just 
as the corporate governance failures C and D were strongly associated with a range 
of potential service-specific triggers). In sum, even those interventions triggered 
by apparently service-specific issues were manifestations of ‘whole systems’ issues. 
Reinforcing the observation regarding differential denial, even in A and B where there 
had been the initial acceptance of the intervention, resistance emerged as soon as the 
receiving organisation was asked to accept that there was also a broader governance 
problem: “we had done everything they asked and now they wanted to talk about 
other issues” (Former Service Director, A). Across both cases, this shift in focus raised 
a number of concerns that the intervention had moved into a much more subjective 
area. From the perspective of the inspectors, they “required a longer-term evaluation 
of quality-based, outcome performance rather than simple process metrics” (Lead 
Inspector, A).
RQ2. Mixture of challenging and supportive activity in an intervention process
We have already discussed how, in cases A and B, the focus of the intervention shifted 
from its initiating concern with service-specific performance to a broader concern 
with corporate governance. As illustrated in Figures 2a and 2b, all of the cases also 
followed another distinct trajectory where, regardless of the point of departure (that 
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is, where ex ante we located the cases when sampling), both formal challenges, that 
were required to be answered and resolved, as well as softer support-type activities, 
were evident through the intervention process.
In case A the process was clearly one of challenge from the outset [A1]. The Chief 
Inspector provided a letter detailing ‘month by month’ expectations ( “we needed 
them to largely complete a baseline assessment of performance by end December” 
(Chief Inspector)). A further letter setting out the oversight “that had to be put in 
place” was sent two months later. Finally, a series of specific initial performance targets 
was set out (such as: reduce the waiting list of unallocated cases). Quarterly targets and 
meetings were agreed. Inspectors validated all information provided and produced 
quarterly progress reports for the Minister. After 18 months the intervention entered 
a second phase [A2], explicitly focused on the corporate governance aspects of the 
problem, and described as “taking off the stabilisers” by one former inspector. This 
phase was different in approach however, building on messages of congratulation 
and encouragement and characterised by significantly reduced inspection activity 
(for example, quarterly reporting was ended). Case D followed a similar trajectory to 
case A, albeit with a consistent emphasis on corporate concerns. The key mechanism, 
an advisory board, was formed to ‘provide advice and direction to the Authority to 
(1) ensure effective management of its improvement programme action plan and (2) 
achieve specific key improvements’ (Terms of Reference). Despite being constituted 
with dual role, at the start of the process the advisory board was predominantly 
concerned with challenging the organisation [D1] – leading to a number of conflicts – 
but after the first 12 months, in part as the scope and role of the board became better 
defined, it became more concerned with supporting a range of improvement activities.
In case B the transition was in the opposite direction. After 15 months of informal 
support arrangements [B1], the shift to a formal intervention [B2] “… came as no 
surprise but it meant that [B] was jolted out of its false sense of security” (Interim 
Chief Executive). Interestingly, some respondents felt that a more challenging approach 
should have been adopted earlier. The first mandated task was to ensure the reliability 
of the performance data and establish an accurate baseline. After this, a series of 
performance targets (time to complete, number of files in process and so on) were 
developed by the inspectorate, in consultation with the Chief Executive, Executive 
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Figure 2a: The challenge-support trajectory
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Directors, political leadership and department as a whole. A quarterly progress 
report was submitted, verified by inspectors and discussed with the Chief Executive, 
directors and heads of service. After 18 months, with now widespread acceptance 
that the problems had corporate as well as service components, interviewees talked 
about the intervention entering its next phase [B3], where the relationship with the 
inspectorate was “cordial but still challenging” (Chief Executive).
The case C management team, in avoiding a formal intervention, generated a 
range of specific performance support programmes. For example, the Improvement 
Development Team (IDT), led by an externally appointed manager, worked on a 
series of improvement initiatives [C1]. Interestingly, in addition to these internal 
support mechanisms, a national improvement agency was commissioned to complete 
an in-depth review, eventually proposing a (150 page) change programme. Equally, 
over time, the work of the IDT was increasingly “to act and be seen as the corporate 
policeman” (Services Director). Although managers stressed that their ‘forceful’ 
consultants did not issue orders or instructions or take over meetings, this work was 
clearly positioned for the key inspection and ministerial stakeholders as providing a 
form of complementary external challenge [C2].
RQ3. Do interventions follow a generic trajectory?
It is relatively simple to establish the formal duration of the externally coordinated 
interventions, which either had a definite start and completion point or clear points 
established for re-inspection to assess the success of any improvement efforts. The 
internally driven cases focused on establishing an ongoing improvement culture, not 
just fixing specific problems, therefore the exact duration of the process was more 
difficult to bound, but examination of the external support and inspection cycles 
revealed a similar number of months.
Different perspectives on the timings of the intervention featured heavily in all the 
interviews. With respect to the initiation of the process, there were interviewees – 
nearly all managers in the receiving organisations – who felt that in general terms the 
intervention had started too soon – thereby not allowing the in-house improvement 
efforts sufficient time to demonstrate meaningful results. Conversely, a few senior 
local authority managers and many of the inspectors talked of specific “unnecessary, 
infuriating delays” in starting the process.4 Further investigation of these delays 
Figure 2b:  The support-challenge trajectory
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revealed some structural issues regarding the legality of any intervention (confirming 
the relevance and applicability of particular statutes) and, in the case of the Advisory 
Board model, putting together the requisite staff. There was also a sense in at least 
two of the cases (B and D) that the relevant authorities were “standing off” even 
in the presence of performance concerns that more than justified an intervention. 
One senior manager (in case B) talked about the regulators needing to “overcom[e] 
their self-denial” and recognise that “it was time for something to be done”. As such, 
the delays reflected a form of mutual resistance to change. Inspectors (and ministers, 
peers, advisors) did not want to appear to be acting rashly, but there was a counter 
argument that many of the aspects of internal denial could only be dealt with once 
the intervention “gave senior officers the reason for doing actions that were unpopular 
in the rest of [the organisation]” (Senior Inspector). In other words, there were 
circumstances where it would have been better to start with ‘more serious’ options 
earlier, challenging traditional ‘ladder of intervention’ models where intervention 
proceeds through increasingly formalised and extensive stages of activity. 
Across the four cases, despite their different focus and form, the total duration of 
intervention activities (that is, to complete the trajectories detailed in Figures 2a and 
2b) was broadly similar (for example,  A=34 months, B=39 months (including 15 
months informal phase), C=36 months, D=32 months). Comments on the dynamics 
of the actual intervention were split across the different phases described above. From 
the perspective of the receiving organisation, the reaction to the challenge phase 
was that it should be in place for as short a period as possible. There was repeated 
concern that over-extending the process could easily become more demotivating. 
The intervention teams argued that this phase could only end when there was no 
longer any meaningful denial of the problems and acceptance of the “whole systems 
nature of the failure”. Equally, the regulators were concerned that a truncated 
‘close monitoring’ period would not give sufficient time to demonstrate sustainable 
improvement. Unsurprisingly, the informal interventions (case B phase 1 and case C) 
had much less clarity regarding timings, in part because there was ambiguity regarding 
the nature of the process (and the ‘threat of an intervention’) and correspondingly, 
no specific conditions for exit.
The shift to the support phase and the impending completion of an intervention 
further changed the dynamics of the process. There was greater sense of comfort with 
a process that had already signalled improvement (such as case A’s ministerial messages 
of congratulations) and was now focused on “equip[ping] the organisation to do the 
job themselves, not to do it for them… to build in sustainability to go on after they 
leave” (Case D Corporate Governance Director). At the same time, for many this 
meant that the interventions had moved beyond the point where there had been 
marked improvement in performance on agreed indicators. Several interviewees felt 
that despite demonstrating improvements beyond those of their ‘non-failing’ peers 
they were not treated on the same level: “at times we wondered if there would ever 
be an exit” (Case D Politician). The regulatory perspective on this issue was clear: the 
need for the continuation of monitoring – even if under a ‘final phase’ of a lighter 
touch form of monitoring – was driven by two factors. First, the need to establish 
sustainability in performance improvement simply required extended observation. 
Second, the need to go beyond intermediate process measures, to understand 
performance outcomes, required a longer timeframe to establish cause and effect. 
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RQ4. Triggers, activities and timings and the success of an intervention process
Comparing the relative success of the different interventions is inevitably problematic; 
all of the cases resulted in improvements measured against externally set criteria and 
were deemed a ‘success’ once there had been a demonstrable and verifiable change in 
the authority. Table 2 summarises these performance outcomes and progress towards 
strategic or corporate governance goals.
In cases A and B, although the interventions did not finish once service performance 
(narrowly defined) had improved, managers and leaders were able to point to 
these objectives measures as a significant indicator of success. In cases C and D, the 
organisations were more reliant upon demonstrating intermediate outcomes such 
as organisational and political change. Unsurprisingly, the relative legitimacy of the 
intervention trigger also appeared to influence internally and externally perceived 
success. We have already discussed the catalytic effect of focusing improvement on 
a specific service group (that is, ‘at risk’ children) but this also fed through to the 
corporate changes needed to embed sustainable performance. Many of the whole 
system improvements were ascribed to new political arrangements, in particular 
Table 2: Outcomes of intervention
Performance outcomes Organisational changes Political process changes
A Significant progress on 
PIs (with inevitable dips) 
throughout intervention. For 
example, performance on 
one PI measured 7.64% but 
within 12 months reached 
73.8% (target of 60%).
New structures and wholly 
redesigned recruitment 
processes (note concerns 
regarding financial 
sustainability of process).
Increased emphasis on social 
services scrutiny with formal 
development programme for 
elected politicians.
B Reviews reported promising/
innovative change 
programmes and improved 
performance against KPIs.
Restructuring. Improvement 
Development Team 
and Performance and 
Development post created. 
(note concerns about ability 
to continue with budget 
constraints)
Revised scrutiny and 
budgeting arrangements in 
line with restructuring.
C Reviews to date highlight 
significant improvements 
with many areas of good or 
excellent service. Multiple 
regeneration efforts have 
been realised.
Restructured into 5 
directorates. Various projects 
and staff capability building. 
Authority ‘positively moving 
forward’ with significant 
changes to cultural and 
managerial atmosphere. 
Revised budgeting and 
planning processes. Major 
training programme for 
elected politicians.
D Interim policy objectives met 
and further stretch targets 
agreed. Follow-up children 
(and adult) social services 
inspections demonstrated 
significant improvements 
(note emerging issues in 
education).
New structures and HR 
strategy adopted to fill 
vacancies. New director of 
corporate governance. AB 
gave ‘a clean bill of health’ for 
governance arrangements.
Ministerial and peer group 
meetings with leadership 
helped foster acceptance 
of need for change. New 
strategic scrutiny and 
budgetary arrangements.
Michael Lewis et al
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enhanced oversight and scrutiny, and it was clear that the focus of the service failure 
(with its prospects for media and voter interest) contributed to their relatively rapid 
adoption.
In the public sector there has been lots of emphasis placed on the need to change 
leadership in order to achieve turnaround. In the education sector for instance, 
individual ‘failing’ schools are often reported as ‘being saved’ by newly appointed 
(super) head teachers. In this research managerial and leadership capability gaps 
had been a significant factor in all of the cases, and most of the councils underwent 
significant voluntary and enforced senior staff changes – although none following the 
explicit guidance of the regulatory family. In line with other research (for example, 
Boyne and Dahya, 2002) there appears to have been a positive impact associated 
with these changes – although establishing what would have happened without 
these changes is of course impossible. Some of the case data suggests that in some 
circumstances retaining and developing senior staff may offer the most potent internal 
and external signal of improvement, but where cognition and leadership capability 
are absent, external intervention is required (Jas and Skelcher, 2005).There is also a 
real danger that fixating on key individuals, and key relationships, can easily become 
a process of ‘scapegoating’ and distract from diagnosing the total systems performance 
and problems.
Given that all of the interventions comprised challenge and support phases, the 
key contributor to success appeared to be how organisations and the intervening 
authorities achieved this balance. The local resource endowment appeared to have a 
direct influence on the success and mix of intervention activities. In case A, for example, 
this larger organisation had the capacity to deal with a very formal challenge period 
whereas, in case B, there was a risk that this smaller organisation would “work to the 
test” and ignore other equally important priorities. One interviewee referred to “the 
bow wave” of intervention, whereby the response to the challenge phase can rapidly 
draw in a wide range of corporate and service resources with a net detrimental effect 
on the rest of the organisation. Several interviewees reflected on a scenario where an 
already heavily depleted Social Services department loses even more of its key staff 
when faced with a “heavy-handed” intervention. Conversely, in those cases where a 
supportive phase was the point of entry, there was a corresponding (and sometimes 
much extended: 15 months in case B) failure to engage with fundamental concerns 
(even if widely recognised in the organisation).
Conclusions: towards a model of the intervention process
All interventions are an exercise in power. Central government draws on its resource 
and legal-political power (French and Raven, 1960) to legitimate performance 
judgements, desired outcomes, the right to intervene, and so on. As one Improvement 
Board Chair emphasised, it was critical that all staff at the ‘receiving’ institution 
recognised that this “is an intervention” – comprising explicit and implicit criticisms 
of the organisation. With respect to the specific legitimisation of any particular 
intervention, our research suggests that there will be a greater emphasis on poor 
service performance as the primary trigger. The greater degree of measurability of 
service delivery when compared with broader governance issues (Hood and Peters, 
2004) provides part of the explanation but, equally, a focus on negative outcomes for 
specific service recipients (such as children, victims of crime, and so on) can generate 
Towards a model of the intervention process
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a compelling political and professional narrative. Indeed, the greater sensitivities 
associated with service issues like child protection and education mean that central 
government intervention powers are often more significant in these areas. When an 
intervention is based on judgements about specific performance metrics and mandated 
improvements are articulated in terms of current and potential service users and their 
requirements (for example,  “it’s all about the children”) this can help to overcome 
any residual ‘denial’ (Boyne, 2004a). 
At least one of the cases was a corporate failure without corresponding service 
performance problems (that is, corporate and service performance decoupled), but 
in all the cases initiated by a specific service problem, there was an associated (even if 
not articulated in the intervention protocol) concern over corporate governance. This 
evidence suggests an asymmetric refinement to the Jas and Skelcher (2005) proposition 
that service function and corporate centre 
performance are loosely coupled.
Boyne’s (2004b) widely cited 3R 
categorisation proposed that organisations 
‘in turnaround’ typically retrench (that 
is, focus on stabilising and reallocating 
resources), and/or reposition (that is, redefine 
core missions and redesign/introduce new 
services) and/or reorganise (that is, internal 
organisational change to support ongoing 
improvement). His subsequent review of 
eight recovery exemplars (Boyne 2006) 
suggested that reorganisation was the only 
R implemented in all cases. In other words, 
this model provides important context 
but it lacks specificity with respect to the 
nature of the intervention process. In this final section we propose a generic model 
as the basis for further conceptual development and practitioner guidance. Based on 
our findings, and the evidence addressing each research question, we adopt a theory 
building approach to construct a new theoretical model of the intervention process; 
the interaction of three elements are represented in Figure 3 and expanded upon in 
the following sections.
Service point of entry, challenging the organisation
All interventions, although an exercise in various forms of power, need to achieve 
legitimacy in terms of the desired outcome, people involved, the activities undertaken 
and the decisions reached. If there is no legitimacy, the potential benefits of the 
intervention are likely to be minimised. The evidence in these cases suggested that 
having a specific service focus helps to deal with many of these concerns, for example 
by deriving judgements from accepted and comparable performance metrics and 
by articulating, where possible, all mandated improvements in terms of current and 
potential service users and their requirements. Similarly, the competencies of any 
external agents could be more precisely configured ex ante for a specific problem 
set, and an initially focused intervention probably helped to constrain resource 
requirements (the ‘bow wave’) and thereby helped minimise the dysfunctional impact 
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of the challenge process. The data suggested a series of operating principles for this 
most formalised and recognisably ‘directive’ phase.
First, recognise that “it is an intervention” (Board Chair), comprising explicit and 
implicit criticisms of staff at the ‘receiving’ institution. At the same time, from the 
outset be sensitive to the fact that responding to challenge (such as collecting data, 
drafting reports, attending meetings, and so on) requires substantial local resource 
commitment. Second, the intervention team (for example,  the Advisory Board in case 
D) must be comprised of credible, competent and committed people. Finally, work to 
a specific start and a reasonable expectancy, subject to performance, of a finish date. 
Given the formality of this phase, strategic use can be made of the ‘run-in’ and ‘run-
out’ periods when local arrangements can be developed and relationships adjusted.
Corporate points of entry 
Although the findings suggest the advantages of a service focused point of entry, this 
is an essentially pragmatic decision based upon resource availability/constraints and 
internal/external political context. What is strongly evident in all the cases is the 
extent to which all interventions have a very clear corporate governance dimension. 
The data suggested a series of principles for addressing service specific and whole 
system issues.
The range of skills included in the intervention team should recognise the ‘whole 
systems’ aspects from the outset (including corporate governance and political 
leadership dimensions) and particular recognition should be given to the advantage 
of including independent ‘voices’.
The timings of the intervention had a direct bearing on the change process (that 
is, when the process started, how long the challenge phase lasted, how long the 
support phase lasted and so on). These dynamics were particularly significant for 
corporate changes. From the perspective of the failing organisation, the intervention 
should be as short as possible – providing performance targets were met. There 
was widespread concern that over-extending the process could easily become 
demotivating. Conversely, it has already been noted how problematic it can be to 
measure governance performance, and correspondingly regulators needed sufficient 
time to demonstrate sustainable systemic improvement.
Poor performance from a senior manager should not be acceptable; however some 
of the case data suggested that the retention and development of senior staff may be 
both the only realistic option available and, more optimistically, can offer a potent 
internal and external signal of improvement. There was also evidence that fixating on 
key ‘failing’ individuals could easily become a process of ‘scapegoating’ and thereby 
distracted from diagnosing the total systems performance problems.
Balancing challenge and support
The cases suggested that a successful intervention process required a balance of 
challenge and supportive approaches. Challenge (and focus) helped address questions 
of legitimacy and effectiveness, but supportive approaches were more sustainable. They 
tapped into the knowledge in an organisation and helped achieve more ownership 
of the outcome: “it’s easy to tell someone how to do something, but far better to 
work with people so they find out the solution themselves” (Service Director, Case 
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B). The transition from one mode to another needs to be carefully considered and 
managed; it placed significant additional pressures on both parties to the intervention. 
This participative phase is reliant on local staff input and this process can be frustrating 
after the apparent clarity and dynamic of expert challenge: “part of the journey is 
dealing with how frustrating it is to ‘advise’ – you see what needs doing and how to 
do it… but you need to help other people see how to do it themselves which takes 
much longer” (Peer CEO, Case C). The data suggested a series of operating principles 
for this more ‘facilitative’ (advising, supporting, mentoring) phase.
It will only be successful if local leadership has a meaningful acceptance of the 
problems faced. This may be more straightforward if there has been a change in political 
and/or managerial leadership, but an effective ‘transition’ from challenge to support is 
likely to require strong elements of individual support (one to one peer mentoring).
It is important to ensure that different interests and levels are represented, but this 
must be balanced with the requirement that staff be both competent and engaged. At 
the same time, there were numerous examples in the cases where greater involvement 
in decision making (being afforded, often for the first time, power) can increase 
engagement and help to develop the very competencies that are required.
Given that failure and recovery can reinforce isolation and an internal focus, this 
phase should emphasise development of a range of formal and informal knowledge 
transfer relationships (for example, forming communities of practice, staff sharing, 
peer support). 
This generic intervention model is not intended to provide an accurate representation 
of highly contingent ‘reality’ evidenced in either the four cases that make up the core 
of this paper, or indeed the US examples presented in the introduction. The intention 
of the model is to generate specific insights for policy maker and practitioner guidance 
and provide a meaningful template for further research into this fascinating and 
increasingly important public administration issue.
Notes
1 In the UK, central government intervention powers (for local government, police, 
education and health) are often presented as a function of mandate (that is, turnout for 
national elections is significantly higher than in local elections) but there remain the 
‘fundamental problems of democratic authority in the application of external pressure 
by one governmental body on another’ Jas and Skelcher (2005, 208).
2 They occur even where there are potentially significant constitutional obstacles, such as 
in the USA, or espoused ideological obstacles, such as with the UK Coalition commitment 
to a localism agenda.
3 In the UK central government intervention powers (for local government, police, 
education and health) have been presented as a function of national financial support 
for local government versus local mandate (that is,  turnout for national elections is 
significantly higher than in local elections).
4 Although difficult to accurately specify, the gap between an intervention decision being 
taken (that is, by the Minister responsible) and the process starting was between three 
and six months.
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